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Madsen v. Women's
Health Center:
INJUNCTION
ESTABLISHING A
36-FOOT
BUFFER ZONE
ON A PUBLIC
STREET FROM
WHICH
DEMONSTRATORS
ARE EXCLUDED
DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE
FIRST AMENDMENT.

The United States Supreme Court in Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, 114S.
Ct. 2516 (1994), held that an
injunction establishing a 36-foot
buffer zone on a public street
from which demonstrators are
excluded does not violate the
First Amendment. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that content-neutral
injunctions restricting speech
pass constitutional muster ifthey
serve a significant government
interest and burden no more
speech than necessary.
In September, 1992, a
Florida state court permanently
enjoined anti-abortion activist
Petitioners from blocking ingress and egress at Respondents' abortion clinic via an adjacent street, and from physically abusing persons entering
or leaving the clinic. Six months
later, the court broadened the
injunction, finding: 1) access to
the clinic was still being impeded; 2) the noise was adversely affecting patients inside
the clinic; 3) the protests were
discouraging patients from approaching or entering the clinic;
and 4) clinic staffmembers were
being subjected to protests at
their homes. The provisions of
the amended injunction excluded Petitioners, and all those
acting "in concert with" them,
from a 36-foot buffer zone encompassing the clinic driveway
and entrance, and private property to the north and west of the
clinic. The amended injunction
also prohibited noisemaking
(i.e., chanting, shouting,
bullhorns, etc.) within earshot

of patients within the clinic, or
the display of "images observable" to patients within the
clinic, during surgical procedures. It further restricted protestors from approaching patients and potential patients without their consent, within 300
feet ofthe clinic. In addition, the
injunction created a 300-foot
buffer zone around the residences of clinic staff in which
demonstrations or noisemaking
. were prohibited.
Petitioners appealed to
the Supreme Court of Florida,
which rejected their argument
that the amended injunction violated the First Amendment, and
upheld the injunction. The Court
of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit heard a separate challenge
to the same injunction shortly
before the Supreme Court of
Florida, and struck it down. The
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict.
The Court began its
analysis by addressing Petitioners' argument that the injunction was content-based because
it restricted only the viewpoint
of anti-abortion protestors. Id
at 2523. In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that
such a finding would "classify
virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint based." Id
The Court found that although
the injunction applied only to
individuals professing an antiabortion viewpoint, it was not
dispositive of a "viewpointbased" restriction. Id at 252324. The Court identified the principal inquiry in determining con-
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=tent-neutrality as whether the
regulation is "without reference
to the content of the regulated
speech." Id. at 2523 (quoting
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The
Court held that the injunction's
restrictions were not directed at
the content of Petitioners ' message, and it was therefore content-neutral. Id at 2524.
The Court proceeded to
determine what standard of review should apply. It rejected
the strict scrutiny standard,
which requires a restriction to
be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." Id. at 2523-24 (quoting
Perry EducationAss 'no v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass 'n., 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Because
the injunction was content-neutral, the Court reasoned that
strict scrutiny, under Perry, was
inappropriate. Id
The Court similarly rejected the reasonable time, place,
and manner test as formulated
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, and similar cases, reasoning that it applies to generally
applicable content-neutral statutes, rather than to injunctions.
Id at 2524. The Court distinguished injunctions from statutes, noting that injunctions are
imposed upon those who have
already violated, or threatened
to violate, the law; whereas statutes apply to the general public.
Id Additionally, the Court reasoned that injunctions carry a
greater threat of censorship or
discriminatory application than
legislation and, therefore, re-

quire greater scrutiny. Id Hence,
the Court determined that the
reasonable time, place, and manner test, as typically applied to
content-neutral statutes, was not
"sufficiently rigorous" in evaluating a content-neutral injunction.ld at 2525.
The Court subsequently
held that the governing standard of review is whether the
provisions of the injunction
"burden no more speech than is
necessary to serve a significant
government interest." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, if the injunction was found to burden
no more speech than necessary
to meet the states objectives, it
would pass constitutional muster. The Court then affirmed
that the significant government
interests noted by Florida's Supreme Court, such as protecting a woman's right to seek
lawful medical services, ensuring the public safety and order,
promoting the free flow oftraffic, and protecting the property
rights ofall citizens, were sufficient to "justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect them." Id. at 2526.
Next, the Court turned
its attention toward evaluating
the challenged portions of the
injunction. The Court upheld
the 36-foot buffer zone around
the clinic entrance and driveway, finding that it "burdened
no more speech than necessary"
to accomplish the government's
goal ofproviding ingress to and
egress from the clinic. Id at
2526-27. The Court noted its
deference to the trial court's
determination that such a buffer

zone was necessary in light of
the first injunction's failure to
accomplishthisgoal.ld at2527.
The Court then evaluated the 36-foot buffer zone as
applied to the private property
north and west of the clinic.
This provision was found to be
unconstitutional because it
"burden [ed] more speech than
[was] necessary" to protect
access to the clinic. Id. at 2528.
The Court found no evidence
that protestors standing in these
areas blocked access to the clinic
in any way. Id
The Court upheld the
injunction's prohibition on
noisemaking "within earshot"
of the clinic, reasoning that it
"burden[ed] no more speech
than necessary to ensure the
health ... of the patients at the
clinic," particularly during periods of scheduled "surgical
procedures". Id However, the
Court struck down the "images
observable" provision, stressing that such a "broad prohibition" burdened more speech
than necessary to achieve the
purpose of limiting threats to
clinic patients or their families
that had allegedly been displayed
on some signs. Id. at 2528-29.
In justifying its decision, the
Court noted that patients and
staffwithinthecliniccouldmore
easily "pull [the] curtains" than
"stop up [their] ears." Id at
2529.
In striking down the
injunction'S prohibition on
unconsented approaches ofpersons seeking the clinic's services, the Court found that such
a provision is unconstitutional
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absent "fighting words" or
threats, and that the First
Amendment requires us to tolerate insulting or even "outrageous" speech. Id. (quoting
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
322 (1988)). Further, the Court
opined that the "consent" requirement alone invalidated the
provision because it burdened
more speech than necessary to
achieve the stipulated goals of
preventing intimidation and ensuring access to the clinic. Id.
The last provision addressed regarded the 300-foot
buffer zone around the residences ofclinic staff. Id. at 252930. The Court struck down the
provision, finding that it constituted a broad ban on "general
marching [or walking] through
residential neighborhoods." Id.
at 2530. Thus, the broad ban on
such picketing burdened more
speech than was necessary to
protect the staff s residences.

Id.
Finally, the Supreme
Court refused to entertain Petitioners' argument that the injunction was invalid "as applied" to non-parties, concluding that Petitioners' lacked
standing, as named parties, to
make such an argument. Id.
Similarly, the Court rejected
their contention that the injunction was susceptible to an
"overbreadth" challenge, finding that the "in concert with"
"phrase itself does not prohibit
any conduct" of third parties.
Id. (citing Regal Knitwear Co.
v.NLRB,324U.S.9,14(1945)).
Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion, but dis-
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sented in part, arguing that injunctions should be judged by a
"more lenient standard [of review] than legislation", because
they are imposed upon persons
who have "engaged in unlawful
conduct".Id. at 2531. Thus, he
argued that more leeway should
be given to injunctions, remedying the unlawful conduct of
some, than to generally applicable statutes containing identical proscriptions. Id. at 2532.
Justice Scalia, with
whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined, concurred
in the judgment in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2534. Justice Scalia argued that the
Court's decision departs completely from its past jurisprudence, accusing the majority of
creating "brand-new for this
abortion-related case, an additional standard of constitutional
review." Id. at2537-38. In sum,
Justice Scalia argued that both
"precedent and policy" demand
that strict scrutiny be applied to
any "speech-restricting" injunctions, "even content-neutral
ones." Id. at 2541. In his view,
"speech-restricting" inj unctions may not attack "content
as content", but they easily lend
themselves to the "suppression
of particular ideas" and groups.
Id. at2538. For this reason, and
because injunctions are issued
by individual judges rather than
legislatures, Justice Scalia asserted that an injunction restricting speech is just as deserving of
strict scrutiny as is content-based
legislation.ld.
In Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, the Supreme
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Court has explicitly denoted the
proper standard for reviewing
the constitutionality ofcontentneutral injunctions. This standard of "heightened review",
Iying somewhere between strict
scrutiny and the reasonable time,
place, and manner standard, may
provide greater opportunity for
portions of such injunctions to
be upheld. However, it will simultaneously require such injunctions to "burden no more
speech than necessary" to
achieve their goals. With its
decision, the Supreme Court attempts to strike a balance between the rights of those wishing to utilize abortion clinics
and the rights of those attempting to protest their very existence. The Court appears willing
to tolerate a certain degree of
infringement upon the free
speech ofprotestors in exchange
for protection ofthe legal rights
of others.
- Victoria M Rife

